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LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING AHEAD AS THE HOME MORTGAGE
DISCLOSURE ACT TURNS THIRTY-FIVE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF LENDING DATA IN A TIME OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
RICHARD D. MARSICO*

L

Introduction

Congress passed the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
("HMDA") 1 in 1975 as a tool to end redlining. Redlining is a broad
term that covers many different practices. In the context of the
passage of HMDA, redlining is a lender's refusal to lend, or lending
on more onerous terms, in urban, older, low-income or predominantly minority neighborhoods, not based on an individualized analysis
of the loan applicant's eligibility for the loan, but on the
characteristics of the neighborhood. Unlike other statutes like the
Fair Housing Act ("FHA") 2 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA"), 3 which target discriminatory behavior, HMDA does not
prohibit redlining, create remedies to eliminate it or penalize lenders
who practice it. Instead, HMDA relies on the power of public
disclosure of lending data to stop lenders from redlining by embarrassing them if they make few or no loans in redlined neighborhoods.
As HMDA turns thirty-five years old, there are four
interrelated themes in its history that suggest a role for HMDA in this
era of financial crisis. First, HMDA's mission has expanded significantly from an anti-redlining statute to include anti-discrimination
and anti- reverse redlining. In 1989, Congress expanded HMDA's
mission to add detecting and eliminating race discrimination in home
mortgage lending to HMDA's original anti-redlining purpose. In
2002, HMDA came full circle. This time, the problem was reverse
redlining-too many high-priced subprime loans in predominantly
minority neighborhoods. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (the "Fed")-the agency responsible for enforcing
HMDA-responded by issuing regulations that expanded HMDA's
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank the School for
its generous support of this research.
1
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10
(2006).
2
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006).
3
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf(2006).
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mission to include detecting and preventing reverse redlining by
requiring lenders to disclose information about the location of their
subprime loans.
Second, to help accomplish HMDA's expanding mission,
both Congress and the Fed increased both the number of lenders that
HMDA covers and the amount of information they are required to
disclose. Originally, HMDA covered only banks and their majorityowned home mortgage lenders. Now, HMDA covers nearly all home
mortgage lenders, whether or not they are owned by banks.
Originally, HMDA required covered lenders to disclose only the
location of their home mortgage loans. Now, HMDA requires lenders
to disclose the geographic source of their home mortgage loan
applications, the race of applicants and borrowers, their decisions on
applications and the interest rate on subprime loans.
Third, even though Congress and the Fed expanded
HMDA's mission and increased the amount of data that lenders are
required to disclose to accomplish this mission, they have generally
stopped short of requiring lenders to disclose enough information to
establish (or not establish) redlining, lending discrimination or
reverse redlining. In its original form, HMDA did not require lenders
to disclose the number of loan applications they received, which
made it difficult to determine whether the absence of lending in
allegedly redlined neighborhoods was due to redlining or lack of
demand for loans. Congressional amendments to HMDA in 1989
required lenders to disclose the number and geographical source of
applications they received, the race of loan applicants and their
decisions on the applications-thus addressing the issue of demand
for loans. But these amendments did not require lenders to disclose
information about the creditworthiness of loan applicants, hampering
efforts to determine whether higher rates of rejections of loan
applications from minority borrowers than whites were due to
relatively weaker creditworthiness or race. In 2002, when the Fed
required lenders to disclose the interest rate on subprime loans, it did
not require them to disclose the credit score of the borrower.
Borrower credit scores would have made it possible to determine
whether the higher interest rate was justified by the borrower's risk
level or attributable to other factors.
Fourth, HMDA data have shown evidence (although not
proof) that lenders are redlining, discriminating and engaging in
reverse redlining. After HMDA's passage in 1975, the data showed a
lack of lending in allegedly redlined neighborhoods. Following the
1989 amendments, the data showed disproportionately high rejection
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rates of loan applications from African-Americans, Latinos and
residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods. With the 2002
amendments, the data showed disproportionately high subprime
lending to African-Americans, Latinos and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods. Despite this evidence, the impact of these
disclosures has been mixed, in large part because the Fed and other
agencies that regulate lenders questioned the weight of the evidence
due to the limitations in HMDA data. The only really significant
impact took place after the 1989 amendments, when public outcry
and the media coverage about the disparate rejection rates based on
race was so strong that it forced Congress to take notice and the
agencies to take action. This led to significant lending increases to
African-Americans, Latinos and residents of predominantly minority
neighborhoods.
Looking ahead, perhaps the lesson to be learned from
HMDA's history is that unless the data disclosures are, on their face,
very compelling-in the form, for example, of highly differentiated
rejection rates on home mortgage loan applications based on raceand if the data do not contain sufficient information about the lending
practice to be remedied, then the data disclosure will not be effective
in eliminating the targeted practice. This lesson may be particularly
apt now. The economic crisis-triggered at least in part by losses that
lenders incurred as a result of defaults and foreclosures on risky and
abusive home mortgage lending practices-has generated several
proposals to strengthen regulation of the financial services industry.
The most prominent of these is the proposed Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act of 2009 ("CFPAA"). 4 The CFPAA would
expand HMDA's mission once again, this time to detect many of the
lending practices that led to the financial crisis and to identify the
lenders that engage in them. 5 HMDA's past seems to be playing itself
out in this proposal. The amendments would require lenders to
disclose information about risky and abusive home mortgage lending
practices, including, for example, the difference between the annual
percentage rate on a bank's loans and a benchmark rate for all banks,
any interest rate adjustment period, and the terms of any pre-payment
penalties. 6 However, the CFPAA would not require lenders to
disclose other information about risky and abusive lending practices,
4

Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 11 lth
Cong. (2009).
5
Id. at § 188.
6
Id. at§ 188(c)(l).
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including, for example, whether the borrower can afford the loan
when originated. Given the catastrophic consequences of unsafe
lending and the potential power of public disclosure, Congress
should take advantage of the current reform opportunity to give
HMDA the tools to identify lending practices that are risky and
abusive and the lenders who engage in these practices.
Part II of this article reviews HMDA's early history, from its
passage in 1975 to 1988. It reviews the legislative history ofHMDA,
revealing Congress' intent to use public disclosure to eliminate
redlining. Part II also documents the limited nature of HMDA's
initial disclosures and the minimal impact the disclosures had. Part
III covers the middle period ofHMDA's history, from 1989 to 2002.
This period includes the expansion of HMDA's mission in 1989 into
a tool to detect and prevent home mortgage lending discrimination
and the corresponding increased data disclosure requirements. Part
Ill also examines the role that the expanded data had in the increases
in lending to African-Americans, Latinos and residents of
predominantly minority neighborhoods that followed the 1989
amendments. Part IV examines HMDA's expansion in 2002 into a
tool to fight reverse redlining by requiring lenders to disclose the
number and location of their subprime loans. The subsequent data
disclosure showed significant disproportionate distribution of
subprime loans in predominantly minority neighborhoods and to
minority borrowers, but the disclosure of this data did not have the
same impact as the disclosure of data after 1989. Part V discusses
proposals to amend HMDA to expand its mission to include
detecting risky and abusive home mortgage lending practices. While
the proposals contained in the CFPAA are helpful, they do not
require lenders to disclose sufficient information to detect the full
range of lending practices that are responsible for high loan default
and disclosure rates. HMDA's past shows that insufficient HMDA
data disclosure requirements undermine HMDA's mission. Finally,
Part VI provides concluding lessons from HMDA thus far. The
enormity of the financial crisis and the role that risky and abusive
home mortgage lending practices played in it suggest that Congress
should learn from HMDA's past and make sure that any amendments
to HMDA will result in disclosure of sufficient information to detect
and prevent the fullest possible range of unsafe and abusive home
mortgage lending practices.

2009-20 I 0
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The Initial Passage and Subsequent Expansion of HMDA:
1975-1988

Congress' intent in passing HMDA was to use the power of
public disclosure to eliminate redlining in low-income, urban and
predominantly minority neighborhoods. HMDA's initial provisions
were limited, covering only banks and their majority-owned
mortgage lenders and requiring them to disclose only the location of
their home mortgage loans. Between 1980 and 1988, Congress and
the Fed made statutory and regulatory changes to HMDA that
improved public access to HMDA data and made the data more
helpful in identifying redlining. These changes included aggregating
HMDA data for all lenders in each metropolitan area, creating central
HMDA depositories in each metropolitan area, requiring lenders to
report the census tract of each loan and extending HMDA coverage
to more lenders. HMDA data in this period frequently showed that
banks made few loans in low-income or predominantly minority
neighborhoods, but the Fed discounted this because of the data's
limitations, particularly in failing to provide information about the
demand for home mortgage loans.
A.

Congressional Intent in Passing HMDA

Congress passed HMDA in 1975 in light of evidence that
banks had "redlined" certain neighborhoods because of
characteristics other than the creditworthiness of the residents. 7
Redlining is used in HMDA's legislative history as a term to describe
several different practices, including failing or refusing to lend,
lending at higher interest rates or more onerous loan terms or
otherwise making it very difficult for a resident of a particular
neighborhood to get a loan regardless of her creditworthiness
because the neighborhood in which the loan would be made has
characteristics the lender does not like. 8 Senator William Proxmire
stated that a lender "should not arbitrarily reject loan applications
from sound credit risks on sound houses simply because he does not
7

Congress found that "some depository institutions have sometimes
contributed to the decline of certain geographic areas by their failure ... to
provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable
terms and conditions." 12 U.S.C. § 280 I (a) (2006).
8
See 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160-61 (1975) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire).
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like the neighborhood, or because he fears it may at some future time
decline." 9
The legislative history of HMDA refers most frequently to
redlining in "older" and "urban" neighborhoods. 10 There are also
references to redlining based on the racial composition of the
neighborhood. Reflecting this, Senator Proxmire stated, "our
financial institutions seem to disdain these older communities,
especially if they happen to be integrated, or adjacent to poorer
neighborhoods." 11 Senator Proxmire cited the example of Oak Park,
Illinois, and suburbs like it, which "have trouble finding mortgage
money because the housing was built 50 years ago, and the
neighborhood has become integrated." 12
HMDA's supporters opposed redlining on several grounds.
First, they suggested that it was wrong for banks to take a

9

Id. at 25, 160; see also id at 25, 162 (statement of Sen. Brooke) (failing to
lend); 121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,622 (1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke)
(refusing to make loans); 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement
of Rep. Stokes) (denying mortgages); id at 34,453 (statement of Rep.
Murphy) (refusing to make mortgages to qualified applicants); id. at 34,576
(statement of Rep. Stokes) ("Redlining is a process whereby qualified
buyers are denied mortgages in certain geographic areas.").
0
' 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,159-60 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("Many,
if not most lenders-banks and savings and loan associations alike-tend to
be reluctant to lend mortgage money to older urban neighborhoods."); 121
CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,622 (1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke) ("[M]any
mortgage lending institutions were not making mortgage loans in older
neighborhoods .... "); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 12 (1975); S. REP. No. 94187, at 3, 5 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 39,861, 40,606 (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (discussing the refusal to lend mortgage money in older urban
neighborhoods); S. REP. No. 94-187, at I (1975) (redlining is a
"reluctan[ce] to make mortgage loans on existing homes in older urban
neighborhoods. There is ample demonstration that credit-worthy persons
are sometimes denied loans on sound homes solely because of the location
of the property.").
11
See 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25, 160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
12
121 CONG. REC. 41,103, 41,709 (1975) (statement of Rep. St. Germain)
(discussing redlining in "ethnic" neighborhoods); id. (statement of Rep. St.
Germain) (stating that redlining occurs "when certain institutions refuse to
lend mortgage money in our Nation's older urban and ethnic
neighborhoods."); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 11 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-187,
at 3 (1975).
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community's deposits without lending to that community. 13 Senator
Proxmire expressed this judgment, stating, "[t]he extreme irony is
that often the banks and savings and loan associations located in
these older neighborhoods draw their deposits from precisely those
communities that cannot get loans." 14 HMDA's supporters in the
House felt the same way. Representative Badillo stated, "[t]hey took
the money of depositors who resided in central city areas, redlined
their neighborhoods, and invested the funds in new housing in the
suburbs." 15
Second, supporters of HMDA argued that redlining was
inconsistent with banks' charter responsibilities. The basis of this
position was that entry into the banking industry was restricted to
entities that had a charter granted by a governmental entity, and that
in return for the privilege to do business granted by the charter, banks
had an obligation to serve the needs of their communities by making
loans there. 16 Senator Brooke was clear about this: "These
institutions operate under charters issued by financial regulatory
agencies which restrict entry into the business on a geographic basis.
They are supposed to serve the area in which they are located, not
only to obtain deposits but also to make loans." 17
13

This sentiment was expressed in the Report of the House Committee on
Banking, Currency, and Housing:
In many instances, after years of placing their savings in
local financial institutions, they [the citizens of redlined
neighborhoods] are now confronted with the inability to
improve their property, or for prospective neighbors to
purchase homes. In many instances, the dollars they have
been saving are being used to develop newer areas, not to
preserve, maintain and enhance their local ones.
H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 12 (1975).
14
121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
15
121 CONG. REc. 34,345, 34,577 (1975) (statement of Rep. Badillo).
16
Congress stated, "depository institutions" have "chartering
responsibilities to provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants
on reasonable terms and conditions," and "to serve the housing needs of the
communities and neighborhoods in which they are located." Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 280l(a)-(b) (2006). Senator Proxmire
stated, "[a]t the same time, a lender that is chartered to serve a community
does have an obligation to give some service to that community." 121
CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). See S.
REP. No. 94-187, at 11 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 19 (1975).
17
121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25,162 (1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
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Third, HMDA proponents argued that redlining was a cause
of the deterioration of urban neighborhoods. 18 Senator Proxmire
described the cycle of disinvestment and deterioration: "When the
neighborhood cannot get mortgage credit, property values drop; new
homeowners cannot move in because they cannot get mortgages.
Eventually, the neighborhood starts to deteriorate and so the lender
can say: See, I told you so." 19 Representative Badillo was even more
graphic: "Potential buyers in search of housing left the cities. Their
going reduced the tax base. Landlords could obtain no funds for
rehabilitation. The neighborhoods continued to deteriorate. Housing
values declined, and redlined areas drifted inexorably toward the
status of demoralizing, dehumanizing, slums." 20
Fourth, the corollary to the idea that redlining led to
deterioration-that lack of credit prevented the rebuilding of redlined
neighborhoods-was also reflected in HMDA's legislative history. 21
Representative Mitchell stated: "I think that if the lending institutions
would give us some mortgage money and stop redlining, we would
be ble [sic] to make our communities much more attractive." 22 The
lack of private credit in redlined neighborhoods made it more
difficult for public housing programs designed to rehabilitate these
areas to work effectively. 23 The report of the House Committee on
Banking, Currency, and Housing expressed this sentiment clearly:
"No federal housing program can ever hope to fulfill our twenty-five
year old national housing goal of a 'decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American' without a firm commitment from
the private sector and, most importantly, from our nation's financial
institutions." 24
18

According to Congress, redlining "contributed to the decline of certain
geographic areas." 12 U.S.C. § 280l(a). See 121 CONG. REC. 34,345,
34,453 (1975) (statement of Rep. Murphy); H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 12
(1975); S. REP. No. 94-187, at 1, 3 (1975).
19
121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25, 160 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
20
121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,577 (1975) (statement of Rep. Badillo).
21
See id. at 34,576 (statement of Rep. Stokes) ("This bill would thereby
remove a major obstacle facing decent citizens trying to stabilize and
revitalize their neighborhoods.").
22
See id. at 34,567 (statement of Rep. Mitchell).
23
According to the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing,
redlining also "exacerbates the problem of providing public sector
investments to stabilize and rehabilitate essentially older neighborhoods
within our cities." H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 4 (1975).
24
Id. at 11 (1975).

2009-2010

HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT TURNS THIRTY-FIVE 213

Congress' primary purpose in passing HMDA was to end
redlining and encourage lenders to make loans in redlined neighborhoods through the disclosure of information about the location of
their home mortgage loans. 25 Senator Proxmire described the means
and ends Congress had in mind when it passed HMDA: "[HMDA]
provides a very gentle remedy-disclosure-to a very serious
national problem, the extreme difficulty of obtaining mortgage credit
in older urban neighborhoods." 26
HMDA is thus an unusual statute in that it does not implement Congressional intent the way that proscriptive or ameliorative
statutes usually do: identify undesirable conduct, prohibit it, create
remedies and proscribe penalties. 27 HMDA does identify redlining as
undesirable conduct, but it does not prohibit redlining, create
remedies or proscribe penalties. It does not deprive a bank of its
.
. practices
.
. 28 require
charter i"f it
re dl.mmg,
a bank to ma1(e a 1oan, 29 or
allocate credit. 30 Instead, HMDA relies on the power of public
25

Senator Tunney stated:
It is clear that our present efforts, both at the State and
Federal level, represent a start, but only a start, in dealing
with the phenomenon of urban decay as it results from
lending practices. However, we must start somewhere,
and the efforts to collect and analyze information about
"redlining" represent an intelligent and natural starting
point.
121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,621 (statement of Sen. Tunney). See id. at
27,612 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (discussing the rights of depositors).
Representative Mitchell stated, "the private sector will never do its job if
[HMDA is not passed]," 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,567 (1975) (statement
of Rep. Mitchell); 121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,622 (I 975) (statement of
Sen. Brooke); 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement of Rep.
Stokes). See H.R. REP. No. 94-561 at 1 I, 14, 20 (1975); S. REP. No. 94187, at I, 10 (1975).
26
121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,159 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
27
See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf (2006). These statutes prohibit
lending discrimination, provide for private and governmental remedies, and
proscribe penalties. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
28
121 CONG. REc. 26,645, 27,612 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
29
Id. ("It would not require a bank to make any loan at all.").
30
HMDA states: "Nothing in this title ... is intended to, nor shall it be
construed to, encourage unsound lending practices or the allocation of
credit." I 2 U .S.C. § 280 I ( c) (2006). Senator Brooke stated, "[ n ]or does any
member of our committee urge a system of credit allocation under which
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disclosure to remedy the undesirable conduct. HMDA's purpose is to
"provide the citizens and public officials of the United States with
sufficient information to enable them to determine whether
depository institutions are filling their obligations to serve the
housing needs of the communities and neighborhoods in which they
are located .... " 31
Congress hoped that requiring banks to disclose the location
of their home mortgage loans would help end redlining. 32 Senator
Proxmire cited evidence that disclosure has this effect, noting,
"disclosure in Baltimore produced a 50-percent increase in mortgage
lending. Similar patterns have been shown in Chicago and in Los
Angeles, as the consequence of disclosure programs in those areas." 33
Disclosure could help in several ways. First, public
disclosure would help community groups in their efforts to pressure
banks to make home mortgage loans in their communities. 34
Representative Stokes described how this would work:
mortgage lending institutions are directed to invest a certain percentage of
their funds in older neighborhoods." 121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25, 162 ( 1975)
(statement of Sen. Brooke). According to Senator Proxmire, "we are not
telling the banks they have to make a loan. We are just saying, disclose what
you do; just let us know." 121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,612 (1975)
(statement of Sen. Proxmire). Senator Tunney stated that HMDA "does not
force the allocation of credit by our Nation's lending institutions, nor does it
represent a first step in such credit allocation." Id. at 27,621 (statement of
Sen. Tunney).
31
12 U.S.C. § 2801(b). Senator Brooke stated that under HMDA, banks'
"depositors and the public at large will be given an opportunity to assess the
lending policies of these institutions by looking at the areas in which they
make mortgage loans." 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,162 (1975) (statement
of Sen. Brooke).
32
According to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, "disclosure is a mild remedy that will have the effect of
encouraging institutions to become more community-minded." S. REP. No.
94-187, at 10 (1975).
33
121 CONG. REC. 26,645, 27,606 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
34
According to Senator Proxmire, "[t]he intent here is that citizens and
public officials will be more successful in discouraging the practice of 'redlining' or the refusal to lend mortgage money in older urban neighborhoods
if they are armed with the facts." 121 CONG. REC. 40,047, 40,606 (1975)
(statement of Sen. Proxmire). According to Representative St. Germain,
"[b ]y requiring financial institutions to publicly disclose by geographic area
the number and dollar amount of home mortgage loans we will enable
citizens and public officials-by arming them with the facts-to combat
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[HMDA data] will give people the tools to identify
the problems in their neighborhoods and to begin to
solve them. It will allow people to have a voice in
what happens to their neighborhoods . . . . It will
give people a fighting chance to maintain their most
valuable asset-their homes. 35
Second, community residents could refuse to place deposits with
36
banks that did not lend in their neighborhoods. Senator Brooke
described how this would work:
In some cities, neighborhood groups have organized
to persuade their local lending institutions to make
more mortgage credit available in their areas. They
argue persuasively that they should be able to make
an educated judgment about where they will deposit
their savings based on the probability of their being
able to obtain mortgage loans from the institutions in
37
which they have made deposits.
what has come to be known as 'redlining' .... " 121 CONG. REC. 41103,
41,709 (1975) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). See H.R. REP. No. 94-561,
at 14, 20 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-187, at 1-2 (1975); see also Richard D.
Marsico, Fighting Poverty Through Community Empowerment and
Economic Development: The Role of the Community Reinvestment and
Home Mortgage Disclosure Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281, 293
(1995) (describing the purpose of HMDA and the public's use of HMDA
data).
35
121 CONG. REc. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement of Rep. Stokes).
36
HMDA "would use the power of market competition-competition for
the saver's dollar-to encourage lenders to do a better job in their own
backyards." 121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire). Senator Proxmire stated, "I think the time has come to let some
sunshine in; to provide information to consumers in these neighborhoods
that have been arbitrarily denied credit, and to let the marketplace decide
which lenders deserve their business. That is all ... [HMDA] does." Id. at
25,166 (statement of Sen. Proxmire). He further stated, "I believe that if
depositors are able to learn, through disclosure, which local lenders are
treating the community fairly, lenders will become more accountable. They
will have a kind of competition for responsibility and for community
service, community availability." Id. at 25, 160. According to Representative
Stokes, HMDA will allow people "to know how their money is being used,
and to channel their own financial resources back into their communities."
121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,576 (1975) (statement of Rep. Stokes).
'7
121 CONG. REC. 23,935, 25, 162 ( 1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
0
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Third, government officials could distribute public sector
38
investments in a way that would promote private investment.
Finally, banks would be shamed by being publicly identified as
practicing redlining. Senator Proxmire suspected that one of the
reasons the banking industry opposed public disclosure of the home
mortgage lending data was "the embarrassment once this data is
publicly available .... I think it is the potential embarrassment and
the accountability to depositors that the industry truly fears .... " 39

B.

Initial Provisions of HMDA

As initially passed, HMDA was limited in scope. It covered
banks and non-bank mortgage lenders that were majority-owned by
banks. HMDA required these lenders to report only the location of
their home mortgage loans. It did not, however, require lenders to
disclose any information about the demand for loans, including, for
example, the number of loan applications they received. Although
amendments to HMDA in 1980 and 1988 expanded its coverage and
usefulness, the amendments did not address this issue. As a result,
HMDA was limited as a tool to detect and deter redlining because
lenders defended small numbers of home mortgage loans in lowincome and predominantly minority neighborhoods as the result of
the lack of home mortgage loan applications from those neighborhoods, and the Fed accepted these arguments.

38

12 U.S.C. § 280l(b). HMDA "would also provide information to
municipal officials concerned with housing, on the effects of local credit
flows." 121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25,160 (1975) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire). "Additionally, ... [HMDA] will help the Congress in making
some decisions about where various community development funds should
go." 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,567 (1975) (statement of Rep. Mitchell).
See H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 14 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 34,345, 34,455
(1975) (statement of Rep. St. Germain) ("[T]he purpose of ... [HMDA] is
to provide at long last the information necessary for the private citizens,
financial institutions, all levels of government working cooperatively to
devise ways and means to stabilize neighborhoods in virtually every city so
that the day will soon come again when private capital essential for ordinary
economic growth once again returns to our cities.").
39
121 CONG. REc. 23,935, 25,161 (1975) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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1.

Initial HMDA Coverage

As originally passed, HMDA covered "depository institutions," defined as commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan
associations and credit unions that made federally related mortgage
40
loans. The Fed issued regulations that deemed majority-owned
subsidiaries of depository institutions as part of their parent
41
institutions. Depository institutions were required to report data if
they had a branch or home office in a standard metropolitan
42
43
statistical area, made federally related mortgage loans and had
44
assets of $10,000,000 or more.

2.

Initial Reporting Requirements

Initially, HMDA required covered lenders to report several
categories of information about their home mortgage loans. First,
HMDA required covered lenders to report the total number and
dollar value of mortgage loans they originated or purchased each
year. 45 Second, for mortgage loans within a metropolitan area in
which the lender had a home or branch office, the lender was
required to report the total number and dollar value of mortgage
loans by census tract when census tract information was available at
40

Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 303(2),
89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (1975) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2)
(2006)).
41
12 C.F.R. § 203.2(c) (1978).
42
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(a)(l) (1975); 12 C.F.R. §
203.3(a)(2) (1978).
43
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 303(2) (1975). The Fed defined a
"federally related mortgage loan" as any loan, other than temporary
financing such as a construction loan, that is secured by a first lien on oneto-four family residential property and is made in whole or in part by an
institution whose deposits are insured by the federal government or that is
regulated by the federal government; or that was guaranteed or insured by
the federal government; or a loan intended to be sold to a govemmentsponsored enterprise. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(d) (1978).
44
12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(l) (1978).
45
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(a)(I) (1975). Mortgage loans were
defined as loans secured by a first lien on residential real property, including
first lien refinancing loans and home improvement loans. Id. at§ 303(1); 12
C.F .R. §§ 203 .2(f)-(i) ( 1978). Residential real property included one-to-four
family homes and multi-family dwellings. Id. at§ 203.2(i).
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reasonable cost, otherwise by zip code. 46 Finally, HMDA required
lenders to report the total number and dollar value of their mortgage
loans on one-to-four family homes that were insured or guaranteed
by the federal government, made to borrowers who did not intend to
occupy the property, or for home improvement. 47
C.

HMDA Expansion from 1980 to 1988

In 1980, Congress amended HMDA to make the data more
accessible and useful. Perhaps the most significant amendment
required the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
("FFIEC") to compile aggregate HMDA data for all HMDA
reporters in each metropolitan area. 48 The legislation required the
FFIEC to provide the aggregate information by census tract and by
groups of census tracts categorized by income level and racial
composition (for example, less than I 0 percent minority, 10-75
percent minority and greater than 75 percent minority). 49 These
aggregate tables were intended to make HMDA much more useful as
a tool for identifying overall lending patterns in a metropolitan area,
identifying the lending patterns of individual lenders, measuring
improvement and helping public officials develop housing and
community development programs. 50 Additionally, the aggregate
tables allowed for evaluations of the performance of an individual
lender compared with all lenders. 51
Congress passed three additional important amendments
during these years. First, it required covered lenders to report the
geographic distribution of most of their HMDA loans by census
tract. 52 Previously, zip code reporting was permitted if reporting by
46
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(a)(2)(A) (1975); 12 C.F.R. §
203.4(a)(I) (1978).
47
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act § 304(b) (1975); 12 C.F.R. §
203(a)(l)(i)-(vi) (1978).
48
Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399,
§ 340(c), 94 Stat. 1614 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2809(a)
(2006)).
49
See S. REP. No. 96-736, at 33-34 (1980).
50 Id.
51
See id.
52
Housing and Community Development Act § 340(a) (1980). The
legislation required banks to report their home mortgage loans by census
tract in counties with a population of greater than 30,000 and by county
name in counties with a population less than 30,000. Id.
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census tract was unreasonably expensive. Census tracts are generally
smaller than zip codes, and more accurately reflect the racial
composition and economic level of the neighborhoods where a lender
made its loans. This change thus made it easier to identify lending
patterns by race and income. Second, Congress required the FFIEC
to create central HMDA data depositories in each metropolitan
area. 53 These central depositories would contain all HMDA data for
all HMDA reporters in each metropolitan area, allowing residents
easier access to all the lending data for all lenders in their
.
54
metropo 1rtan area.
In 1988, Congress amended HMDA once again, expanding it
by increasing the number of lenders subject to its disclosure
requirements. The 1988 amendments expanded HMDA to cover
mortgage banking subsidiaries of bank holding companies or savings
and loan holding companies and savings and loan service
corporations that originate or purchase mortgage loans. 55 Previously,
HMDA covered mortgage banks only if they were majority-owned
by banks. 56

D.

Uses ofHMDA Data from 1975 to1988

The data released during this first phase of HMDA's history
were useful but had limitations. This data could be analyzed in many
ways, frequently in conjunction with other publicly available data
such as the median income and racial composition of census tracts
and the amount of deposits in bank branches. For example, the data
could show: 1) the total number and dollar value of home mortgage
loans that the bank made in low-income or predominantly minority
neighborhoods compared with its number and dollar value of loans in
upper-mcome or white neighborhoods; 2) the percentage of the
Id.
Home Mortgage Disclosure; Revision of Regulation C and Aggregation
Tables, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,780, 11,786 (Feb. 10, 1981) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 203). Before the Internet, which now gives access to all HMDA
data for all covered lenders and all metropolitan areas, these central
depositories were the only place to collect such data. HMDA data are now
available at the website of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, www.ffiec.gov.
55
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242,
§ 565(a)(l), 101 Stat. 1815 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
2802).
56
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
53
54
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bank's loans m low-income or predominantly minority
neighborhoods compared with its percentage in upper-income or
white neighborhoods; and 3) the percentage of the bank's loans in
low-income or predominantly minority communities compared with
other banks' percentages. 57 HMDA data could also be used to
calculate a bank's "loan-to-deposit ratio" ("LDR") 58 and compare the
bank's LDR with the LDRs of other banks. Frequently, these
analyses showed that a bank made proportionately fewer loans in
low-income and predominantly minority communities than in upperincome or white communities, its percentages of loans in low-income
and minority communities was lower than other banks', or that it had
a low LDR either in absolute terms or relative to other banks. 59
The Fed, however, questioned whether any of these findings
showed redlining. The Fed stated that HMDA data were limited in
their ability to show redlining because the data did not show the
creditworthiness of the loan applicant, the level of the demand for
loans or any other information about the bank's other types of
loans. 60 The Fed also questioned the meaning of a low LDR, stating
that there may be many reasons a neighborhood might generate more
deposits than loans. 61
The irony with this is that the Fed found that the data that
Congress required lenders to disclose to show whether they were
redlining were insufficient to determine whether they were in fact
redlining-even though on their face the data showed evidence that
lenders were redlining as Congress suspected. The Fed's approach,
although perhaps ironic, was not entirely unreasonable because the
data, standing alone, were insufficient to prove redlining. Notably
lacking was information about the demand for loans, the borrower's
creditworthiness and the value of the collateral.
Even though the Fed's view of HMDA data was not
unreasonable, the problem with the Fed's response to the data was
that the Fed did not treat disproportionately low lending in
predominantly minority or low-income neighborhoods as evidence
57

See Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment
Act, 20 FORD. URB. L. J. 165, 230-32 (1993) [hereinafter CRA Guide].
58
The LDR measures the dollar amount of a bank's home mortgage loans in
a community as a percentage of the community's deposits in the bank's
branches in that community. Id. at 234.
59
See id. at 233-35.
60
See id. at 238-39.
61
Id. at 235.
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that redlining might exist and that further investigation was
necessary. The Fed did not take the next step and investigate whether
lower lending rates in predominantly minority neighborhoods were
the result of redlining. The Fed and the other federal agencies
responsible for enforcing statutes intended to address redlining or
lending discrimination-including the Community Reinvestment Act
of 1977 ("CRA"), 62 the FHA, 63 and the ECOA64-did not pursue
62

12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006). The CRA requires banks to meet the credit
needs of the local communities they serve, including low- and moderateincome neighborhoods. Id. at§ 290l(b). Four federal agencies-the Fed, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Office of Thrift Supervision-divide CRA enforcement responsibility
by periodically reviewing the record of the banks they supervise to
determine whether they meet community credit needs and then taking that
record into account when considering bank expansion applications. Id. at§§
2901(1), 2903(a)(l)-(2).
63
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006). The FHA prohibits discrimination in the
sale, rental or terms and conditions of the sale or rental of housing on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin or
disability. Id. at § 3604(a), (b), (f). FHA also prohibits discrimination in
residential real estate-related transactions, including making such
transactions available and their terms and conditions, on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin. Id. at §
3605(a). Residential real estate-related transactions include making loans or
providing other financial assistance for purchasing, constructing, improving,
repairing or maintaining a dwelling. Id. at § 3605(b). The FHA has been
construed to prohibit redlining. See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co.,
408 F. Supp. 489, 494 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development has broad enforcement authority over FHA, including
commencing administrative complaints, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), initiating
investigations, issuing subpoenas and ordering discovery in aid of
investigations. Id. at § 3611. The Attorney General of the United States has
the authority to commence lawsuits challenging a pattern or practice of
discrimination. Id. at§ 3614(a).
64
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2006). The ECOA prohibits any creditor from
discriminating in any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status or age. Id. at § 1691 (a).
General enforcement authority of the ECOA is in the hands of the Federal
Trade Commission, id. at § 169lc(c), but several other agencies, including
the agencies that enforce the CRA, are authorized to enforce the ECOA with
respect to entities under their jurisdiction, id. at §§ 169lc(a), (a)(l). The
Attorney General of the United States also has the authority to commence
lawsuits challenging a pattern and practice of discrimination. Id. at §
1691e(h).
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additional data or remedies, which were available to them as
enforcement agencies, that could have shown whether the lending
disparities were the result of discrimination. Nor did they use their
enforcement authority to bring discrimination lawsuits under the
FHA or the ECOA, or to deny bank mergers under the CRA. 65 It was
not until 1992, after the 1989 amendments to HMDA expanded its
disclosure requirements, that these agencies took a more aggressive
stance toward disproportionately low lending in minority and lowincome communities.

III.

HMDA Revolution: 1989-2002

The year 1989 was a watershed year for HMDA. Congress
passed three significant amendments to HMDA that year, which
helped trigger a revolution in the home mortgage lending market.
The amendments increased the number of lenders subject to
HMDA's reporting requirements and expanded the data disclosure
requirements to include the number of home mortgage loan
applications lenders received, the race and income of each applicant
and the location of the neighborhood in which the property that was
the subject of the loan application was located. With this amendment,
not only did Congress expand HMDA's coverage, but it expanded
HMDA's mission to include detecting and preventing lending
discrimination. Within a few years of these amendments, the market
share of loans to African-Americans, Latinos, low-income
predominantly minority
individuals, and low-income and
neighborhoods had increased dramatically.

A.

1989 Amendments to HMDA

First, Congress expanded HMDA to cover "other lending
institutions," which are defined to include "any person engaged for
66
profit in the business of mortgage lending." Under this amendment,
65

RICHARD 0. MARSICO, DEMOCRA TTZING CAPTT AL: THE HISTORY, LAW,
AND REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 58-59 (2005)
[hereinafter DEMOCRATIZING CA PTT AL].
66
Financial Institution Recovery, Reform, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 1278,
lOlst Cong. § 12ll(d)-(e) (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
2802(4) (2006)). The Fed subsequently issued regulations that defined a
non-bank lending institution as an institution whose home purchase loan
originations equaled or exceeded I0 percent of its loan originations,
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non-depository home mortgage lenders that were not subsidiaries of
banks or savings and loan holding companies were now covered by
HMDA. The Fed stated that Congress passed this amendment in an
attempt "to cover a wide range of lenders in order to capture the
fullest possible information regarding mortgage lending patterns."67
Second, the amendments required lenders to report the total
number and dollar amount of home mortgage applications they
received. 68 Regulations issued by the Fed required lenders to disclose
their decision on each application. 69
Third, the amendments required lenders to disclose the total
number and dollar amount of their home mortgage loan originations
and applications, grouped according to census tract and the income
level, racial characteristics and gender of each applicant and
borrower. 7 Congress passed this amendment to make HMDA a more
effective tool in identifying lending discrimination and enforcing the
antidiscrimination laws. 71 The Fed reflected this in the regulations it
issued to implement the amendments, stating in the preamble that
one of the purposes of HMDA is "[t]o assist in identifying possible
discriminatory lending patterns and enforcing antidiscrimination
statutes."72 Congress passed these amendments as part of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, 73 an earlier version of the 2008 financial bailout.
Representative Joseph Kennedy, in a statement expressing the
purpose of HMDA amendments, and relevant to current proposals to
reform HMDA, stated:
[l]t is 2 to 3 times harder if the color of your skin
happens to be black or brown than if the color of
your skin is white ... to receive a home mortgage. It
does seem to me if we are pumping in over $200

°

measured in dollars. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,356, 51,363 (Dec. 15, 1989) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203).
67
Id. at 51,359.
68
H.R. 1278, § 12ll(c) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(l)(2)).
69
54 Fed. Reg. at 51,356.
70
H.R. 1278, § 12ll(a)(3) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4)).
This requirement did not apply to lenders with $30 million or less in assets.
Id. at§ 121 lG) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(i)).
71
H.R. REP. No. 101-222, at 458 (1989) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N 432, 497. See 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,357.
72
54 Fed. Reg. at 51,362.
73
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
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billion into the savings and loan industry and into
our nation's financial institutions, that the very least
we could expect is that we do not continue a pattern
of discrimination that may exist .... " 74

B.

Additional HMDA Amendments: 1991-1996

Between 1991 and 1996, Congress made four amendments to
HMDA; three expanded HMDA and one contracted it. In 1992, the
Fed, acting pursuant to Congressional amendment, once again
increased the number of non-depository home mortgage lenders
subject to HMDA by adding an alternative test for determining
whether such a lender was covered. These lenders would be subject
to HMDA if their assets, combined with any corporate parent, met
the existing$ I 0 million asset test, or, in the alternative, if they made
100 home mortgage loans, including refinancings, in the previous
year. 75 This amendment was intended to include within HMDA more
non-depository mortgage lenders that sell the loans they originate
rather than hold them in their portfolios, thus limiting their total
assets. 76
In 1992, Congress amended HMDA to require covered
lenders to make available to the public a list of all the loan
applications they received, organized by census tract, and including
all data required by HMDA (the "loan application register"), to
require lenders to make their HMDA data available to the public
within three days of receiving them from the FFIEC, and to require
the FFIEC to make HMDA data available to the public by September
I of each year. 77 The purpose of these provisions was "to encourage
the relevant federal agencies to expedite the processing, analysis, and
dissemination of HMDA data and make it [sic] available to the
public at the earliest possible time." 78 Congress wanted to "ensure
that the public receives useful and timely information regarding the
lending record of financial institutions" that would "assist in efforts
74

135 CONG. REC. H.2739-03 (1989) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
57 Fed. Reg. 56,963, 56,963 (Dec. 2, 1992) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
203.3(a)(2)).
76
Id. at 56,964.
77
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, H. 5334, 102nd
Cong.§ 932(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2803U)-(l)).
78
H.R. REP. No. 102-760, at 160 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3281, 3440.
75
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to enforce the fair lending laws." 79 Congress also believed that
orgamzmg loan application registers by census tract would
"significantly add to their utility as a research tool .... " 80
In 1995, the Fed amended its HMDA regulations to require
banks that are obligated under the CRA to report their small business
loans to collect and report the geographic location of the applications
and loans on any property outside the Metropolitan Statistical Areas
("MSAs") in which they had a home or branch office, or outside any
MSA. 81 The Board adopted these expanded reporting requirements to
"provide information about lenders' overall mortgage lending
activity that will assist in developing a more accurate CRA
assessment." 82
In 1996, Congress contracted HMDA's coverage; this was
the first, and remains the only, time Congress or the Fed decreased
the number of lenders covered by HMDA. Congress made a one-time
adjustment in the lending asset threshold that triggered reporting
obligations for depository institutions, increasing the $10 million
threshold by the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index
("CPI") from 197 5 through 1996. 83 For each year after 1996, the
asset threshold would increase by that year's CPI percentage
increase. 84
C.

New Uses ofHMDA Data and the Fed's Response

The amendments to HMDA during the second phase of its
history, particularly the 1989 HMDA amendments, made several new
analyses of HMDA data possible. One analysis compares a bank's
rate of rejecting home mortgage loan applications for property in
predominantly minority neighborhoods or from minority applicants
with its rate of rejecting applications for property in predominantly

79

Id. at 159.
Id.
60 Fed. Reg. 22,223, 22,225 (May 4, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §
203.4(e)).
82
Id. at 22,224.
83
See H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. § I IO(a) (1996) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 2808(b)(2)).
84
12 U.S.C. § 2808(b )(I) (2006). The 2009 threshold is $39 million. 73
Fed. Reg. 78,587, 78,616 (Dec. 23, 2008).
80
81
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white neighborhoods or from white applicants. 85 A second common
analysis compares a bank's minority neighborhood/white neighborhood or minority applicant/white applicant loan application
rejection rate ratio with the same ratio for all lenders in the bank's
community. 86 A third common analysis compares the percentage of a
bank's loans to predominantly minority neighborhoods or minority
borrowers with the aggregate percentages for all lenders in the bank's
•
87
commumty.
Once again, the Fed was initially hesitant to use the new
HMDA data the way Congress intended-to detect discriminatory
home mortgage lending. If, for example, a bank made a lower
percentage of loans to predominantly minority neighborhoods than
the aggregate percentage, or if it had a higher African-American/
white denial rate ratio than the aggregate, this was rarely enough to
give the bank a failing CRA rating or to derail its merger
application. 88 The Fed explained, "HMDA data ... provide only
limited information about the covered loans. HMDA data, therefore,
have limitations that make them an inadequate basis, absent other
information, for concluding that an institution has not assisted
85

Congress had this sort of comparison in mind when it passed the 1989
HMDA amendments: "An especially significant change to HMDA is the
new requirement for disclosure of information on completed applications.
Collection of data on completed applications will permit comparison of
acceptance and rejected statistics." H.R. REP. No. 101-222, at 459 (1989)
(Conf. Rep.).
86
See, e.g., Richard D. Marsico, Patterns of Lending to Low-Income and
Minority Persons and Neighborhoods: The 1999 New York Metropolitan
Area Mortgage Lending Scorecard, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 199, 23945 (2000) [hereinafter Patterns of Lending]. For example, if a bank rejects
forty percent of applications from African-Americans and twenty percent
from whites, its rejection rate ratio is two. This ratio is then compared to the
aggregate ratio for all lenders in the bank's community.
87
Id. For example, the data make it possible to determine the percentage of
a lender's loans to African-Americans or to predominantly minority
neighborhoods and compare it with the percentage of loans to the same
groups by all lenders in the bank's community.
88
See DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL, supra note 65, at 106-13; CRA Guide,
supra note 57, at 237-41. Under the CRA, all banks are evaluated
periodically for their record at meeting the credit needs of their community.
12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(l) (2006). A bank must apply to the federal banking
agency that regulates it for permission to merge with another bank. 12
U.S.C. §§ 2902(3)(e), 2903(a)(2) (2006). The bank's CRA record is relevant
to the agency's consideration of its application. 12 U .S.C. § 2903(a)(2).
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adequately in meeting its community's [sic] credit needs or has
engaged in illegal lending discrimination."89 According to the Fed,
the reason HMDA data is inadequate is that they do not contain
information about the creditworthiness of the borrower, the value of
the collateral or other important information about the loan. 90
Nevertheless, by the mid-l 990s, the Fed no longer
completely discounted the evidence of lending discrimination
derived from HMDA data. The Fed finally stated that HMDA data
could be used to help identify banks to investigate for possible
lending discrimination, something it had not been willing to admit
91
prior to the 1989 amendments. The Fed conceded, for example, that
if a bank's HMDA data showed significant differences in rejection
rates or lending percentages based on race, further analyses, such as
comparative analyses of loan application files of minorities and
whites, would be merited. 92

C.

The Impact of the New HMDA Data 93

Data under the 1989 HMDA amendments were released in
late 1991. The data showed that in 1990 lenders rejected home
mortgage loan applications from African-Americans more than twice
as frequently as from whites, nearly 1.5 more frequently from
Latinos, and twice as frequently for property in predominantly
minority neighborhoods than for property in predominantly white
94
These disclosures triggered a chain reaction.
neighborhoods.
Journalists, community groups, and academics published studies that

89

DEMOCRATIZING CAPTT AL, supra note 65, at 110 (quoting Legal
Developments, Wells Fargo & Co., 86 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 832, 845
(2000)).
9
°CRA Guide, supra note 57, at 238-39.
91
Id. at 239.
92 Id.
93
For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the release of this data,
see Richard D. Marsico, Shedding Some Light on Lending: The Effect of
Expanded Disclosure Laws on Home Mortgage Marketing, Lending, and
Discrimination in the New York Metropolitan Area, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
481 (1999) [hereinafter Shedding Some Light on Lending]; DEMOCRATIZING
CAPITAL, supra note 65, at 168-72.
94
Glenn B. Canner et al., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data
on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 859, 870 tbl.6 (1991).
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confirmed the results in their localities. 95 Community groups
increased their advocacy efforts with banks and government
.
96
agencies.
Governmental agencies followed these disclosures with
strengthened enforcement of the CRA, the FHA, and other related
laws. 97 For example, the federal banking agencies tightened their
review of bank CRA records and bank merger applications by
issuing fewer passing grades on CRA examinations of banks and
denying more merger applications on CRA grounds. 98 They also
adopted stronger CRA regulations that focused more scrutiny on
bank lending, investment and service records as opposed to focusing
on lending efforts and procedures, as the previous regulations had
done. 99 The Attorney General filed its first lending discrimination
case against a bank, followed by twelve more lending discrimination
cases that covered all aspects of the home mortgage lending process
and a wide range of lenders. 100
Lenders, in response to the negative publicity and the
increased governmental enforcement efforts, took several steps to
increase their lending to minority and low-income persons and
neighborhoods, including creating new lending programs, adopting
different loan eligibility criteria and increasing their outreach
efforts. 101 The results were dramatic. From 1991 to 1998, the overall
95

Jaret Seiberg, Banks Making Good Progress In Their Fair-Lending
Efforts, 166 AM. BANKER 1, 10 (Sept. 16, 1996) ("The first year's [HMDA]
data, which covered 1990, focused public attention on disparate rejection
rates for whites and minorities. The numbers were publicized on the front
pages of newspapers across the country-and immediately drew charges of
bias from activists."). See, e.g., Joel Glenn Brenner & Liz Spayd, A Pattern
of Bias in Mortgage Loans, WASH. POST, June 6, 1993, at Al; David R.
Sands, D.C. Banks Said to Favor White-Area Investments, WASH. TIMES,
June 5, 1992, at A2.
96
See Shedding Some Light on Lending, supra note 93, at 499-502.
97
See id at 502-11 for a more complete description of these efforts.
98
Id. at 507, 507 n.95. The federal banking agencies awarded satisfactory
CRA ratings to 89% of banks in 1992, down from 98% prior to June 30,
1990. Id at 507 n.94. They also denied at least ten applications on CRA
grounds between 1992 and 1995, at least as many as they had denied in the
previous history of the CRA. Id. at 506 n.95.
99
Id. at 508-09.
100
See Shedding Some Light on Lending, supra note 93, at 503-05 & nn.7383 for a complete list and description of these cases.
101
Id. at 511-13.
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market share of home mortgage loan approvals held by AfricanAmericans, Latinos, LMI individuals, predominantly minority
neighborhoods and low-income neighborhoods increased by 68%,
20%, 36%, 8% and 28%, respectively. 102
IV.

2002-2010: HMDA Comes Full Circle-Detecting and
Preventing Reverse Redlining

In 2002, the Fed made several significant amendments to
HMDA regulations-effective for data collected in 2004-that
increased the number of lenders HMDA covers and expanded and
enhanced the information they must disclose. 103 The purposes of the
2002 amendments were to improve HMDA's effectiveness as a tool
for fair lending enforcement and to gather data that would more
comprehensively and accurately describe the home mortgage market,
including the subprime home loan market. 104 Once again, the Fed
expanded HMDA's coverage and its mission, this time to include
detecting and preventing reverse redlining in the form of
disproportionately higher rates of higher cost subprime loans in
predominantly minority neighborhoods. In some ways, HMDA's
purpose had come full circle, from detecting and eliminating
redlining in the form of a bank's failure to lend, to detecting and
preventing reverse redlining in the form of too many high-cost loans.

A.

Interest Rates on Loans

The late 1990s and early 2000s saw tremendous growth in
subprime lending. 105 With this growth came allegations that subprime
DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL, supra note 65, at 171 tbl.7.7.
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7222 (Feb. 15, 2002) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203) (amending Regulation C (Home Mortgage
Disclosure) to increase disclosure requirements under HMDA and "expand
the coverage of nondepository lenders by adding a $25 million dollar
volume test to the existing percentage-based coverage test"). The
amendments became effective for data collected after January 1, 2004.
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 30,771, 30, 771 (May 8, 2002) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203).
104
Subprime loans are loans at higher interest rates to borrowers whom
lenders deem to be higher default risks because of factors such as a weak
credit history. Patterns of Lending, supra note 86, at 200.
105
See Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7228; Robert B. Avery
& Glenn B. Canner, New Information Reported Under HMDA and its
lOZ
103
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loans were disproportionately distributed among borrowers by race,
with African-Americans and Latinos receiving higher shares. 106
There was suspicion that this distribution pattern was not based on
creditworthiness but on race. 107 In essence, this claim was one of
reverse redlining. Now, low-income and predominantly minority
communities were not receiving too few loans, they were receiving
too many. The most important of the Fed's 2002 regulatory
amendments addressed this issue. It required lenders to report the
annual percentage rates ("APR") on first lien home mortgage loans
when the APR is at least three percentage points higher than the yield
on Treasury securities with comparable periods of maturity, and it
required lenders to report the APR on subordinate lien home
mortgage loans when the APR is at least five percentage points
higher. 108 These amendments were intended to provide information
about the subprime lending market. The Fed, in creating the interest
rate reporting requirements, determined that most first and second
lien loans that met the APR reporting triggers were subprime. 109
The new data allow researchers to analyze subprime lending
distribution patterns based on the race or income of borrowers and
the racial composition or income level of the neighborhoods in which
the property is located. For example, it is now possible to compare
the percentage of home mortgage loans that African-Americans or
Latinos receive that are subprime with the percentage of loans that
whites receive that are subprime. It is also possible to identify lenders
whose percentage of subprime home mortgage loans to minorities or
predominantly minority neighborhoods are higher than the aggregate
Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344, 349
(2005) (discussing one industry source's estimate that the annual dollar
volume of subprime lending increased from $5 billion in 1994 to over $530
billion in 2004).
106
See, e.g., Patterns ofLending, supra note 86, at 200-01, 235, 268.
107
See, e.g., JIM CAMPEN, BORROWING TROUBLE? V: SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
LENDING IN GREATER BOSTON, 2000-03 (2005). See generally CALVIN
BRADFORD, RISK OR RACE? RACIAL DISPARITIES AND THE SUBPRIME
REFINANCE MARKET (2002); DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTT WILES, Two
STEPS BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND
THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1999); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
AND URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000).
108
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,217, 43,219-20, 43,223
(June 27, 2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l2)).
109
Id. at 43,219-20.
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percentage for all lenders. The results of these analyses can help
indicate whether there is reverse-redlining in the home mortgage loan
market and whether particular lenders might be engaging in reverseredlining. Up until this amendment, studies of subprime lending were
much less precise. Analysts could not use HMDA data to determine
whether a loan was subprime, so they generally counted a loan as
subprime if it was made by a subprime lender as identified by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and
counted loans by all other lenders as prime. 110 The problem with such
studies was that subprime lenders also make prime loans and prime
lenders also make subprime loans.
When the Fed required lenders to disclose the APR on home
mortgage loans, it decided not to require them to disclose the
borrower's credit score, which would have made the APR data a
much more useful tool for detecting unfair lending practices in the
subprime lending market, one of the Fed's stated reasons for
requiring APR disclosure. 111 Because the justification for charging
higher interest rates on subprime home mortgage loans is that the
borrower has a higher risk of default, disclosure of a borrower's
credit score-which helps establish the borrower's risk level-would
have helped to explain differences in subprime lending patterns
based on race. The Fed declined to require lenders to report credit
scores because it found that the burden on lenders of producing the
information would outweigh any additional benefit the credit score
would provide. 112
B.

Other Changes

The Fed made several other significant amendments to
HMDA in 2002. First, the Fed once again increased the number of
non-depository home mortgage lenders subject to HMDA by adding
a third alternative test to the $10 million total assets test and the 100home mortgage loan test. The Fed required non-depository lenders

110

See Patterns of Lending, supra note 86, at 215 n.30.
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,656, 78,661 (proposed Dec.
15, 2000).
112
Id. at 78,657 ("The Board believes that, taken as a whole, the proposed
changes to Regulation C strike an appropriate balance between benefit and
burden.").
111
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that made at least $25 million in loans to report data under HMDA. 113
The Fed stated that one of the purposes for this change was to cover
more non-depository mortgage lenders because they were
"particularly active in the subprime market." 114
In another change related to subprime lending, the Fed
required lenders to disclose whether a home mortgage loan was covered by the Homeownership Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"). 115 A
loan is covered by the HOEP A if the interest rate on a first lien home
mortgage loan is more than eight percentage points higher than the
yield on Treasury Bills of comparable maturity and ten points higher
for second lien loans. 116
The Fed made several additional changes to HMDA to make
it more useful in identifying discrimination in the home mortgage
market. First, the Fed required lenders to disclose whether a
particular home mortgage loan application or origination was for a
manufactured home. 117 The Fed made this change because
applications for loans to purchase manufactured homes have higher
denial rates than loans for traditional homes. 118 Loans to purchase
manufactured homes are underwritten differently, and thus reporting
whether an application or loan was for a manufactured home would
improve the usefulness of HMDA data for understanding the home
mortgage loan market and for detecting lending discrimination. 119
The Fed also required lenders to disclose denials of requests
for preapproval of a loan application and whether an application that
was originated was initiated as a request for preapproval. 120
According to the Fed, "preapproval data will allow comparisons of
minority and non-minority populations that will serve as useful

113

Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7225, 7237 (Feb. 15,
2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(2)(i)(B)).
114
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 65 Fed. Reg. at 78,657.
115
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7229-30, 7237 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l3)).
116
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, HMDA 2004:
Revisions to Regulation C-A Training Presentation, http://www.ffiec.gov/
hmda/pdf/hmdatraining2003.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
117
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7227 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(5), app. A~ l.A.4).
11s Id.
119 Id.
120

Id. at 7223-24, 7237 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(4)).
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screening devices to help identify underwriting processes and
practices that may warrant scrutiny." 121
Additionally, the Fed required lenders covered by HMDA to
inquire about the race, ethnicity and gender of individuals who
applied for loans by telephone. 122 The Fed made this change in an
effort to increase the percentage of loans for which the race, ethnicity
and gender of individuals was reported; the percentage of
applications for which this data was not reported had increased from
8% in 1993 to 28% in 2000. 123 The Fed suspected that one of the
reasons for this was an increase in the percentage of applications
taken by phone. 124 The Fed stated that requiring lenders to inquire
about ethnicity, race and gender in phone applications will "serve the
fair lending enforcement purpose of HMDA by improving the data
obtained on ethnicity, race, and sex; the [Fed] believes this benefit
outweighs the costs of compliance." 125
Finally, in a move designed to help understand subprime
lending and potential lending discrimination, the Fed required
lenders to report whether a home mortgage loan was a first or
subordinate lien. 126 The Fed instituted this requirement to help
interpret the new pricing data and to better understand differences in
denial rates. 127 The Fed stated that interest rates and denial rates
varied based on whether a loan was a first lien or a second lien and
that knowing the lien status of a loan was an important part of
understanding pricing and denial rate data. 128
C.

Current HMDA Reporting Requirements

The current HMDA coverage and reporting requirements are
significantly different from what they were in 1975. Before
examining the data released after the 2002 amendments, it is helpful
to summarize HMDA's current reporting requirements. This section
is divided into two parts: 1) the rules relating to the lenders that
121

Id. at 7224.
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 43,218, 43,221, 43,223 (June
27, 2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A if l.D.2.).
123
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 7228.
124 Id.
125
Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. at 43,221.
126
Id. at 43,220-21 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(14)).
127
Id at 43 221
122

12s

Id
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HMDA now covers and 2) the rules relating to the data that covered
lenders are required to disclose.
1.

Covered Lenders

HMDA rules regarding the lenders that must report loans are
divided into two parts. The first part applies to banks, savings
associations and credit unions ("depository institutions") and the
second part applies to other for-profit home mortgage lenders ("nondepository institutions"). 129 A depository institution must report data
if during the preceding calendar year it: 1) had assets above an
annually adjusted inflation-based threshold; 130 2) had a home or
branch office in an MSA; 131 and 3) either a) was federally insured or
regulated; 132 or b) originated one home purchase or home refinance
loan secured by a first lien on a one-to-four family home that was: 133
1) federally insured, guaranteed or supplemented; 134 or 2) intended
for sale to Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") or
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"). 135 A
non-depository institution must report data if during the previous
calendar year it: 136 1) originated home purchase loans that equaled at
least a) ten% of its dollar volume of loan originations 137 or b) $25
million; 138 2) had a home or branch office in an MSA; 139 and 3) either
a) had total assets of more than $I 0 million, including the assets of
any parent corporation; 140 or b) originated at least 100 home purchase
loans. 141

129

12 U.S.C. §§ 2802(2), (4), 2808(b) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.2(e)(l),
(e)(2) (2008).
130
12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(l)(i) (2008). In 2009, the asset threshold was $39
million. 73 Fed. Reg. 78,616 (Dec. 23, 2008).
131
12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(l)(ii) (2008).
132
Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iv)(A).
133
Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iii).
134
Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iv)(B).
135
Id. at§ 203.2(e)(l)(iv)(c).
136
Id. at§ 203.2(e)(2)(i).
137
12 C.F.R. § 203.2(e)(2)(i)(A) (2008).
138
Id. at§ 203.2(e)(2)(i)(B).
139
Id. at § 203 .2( e)(2)(ii).
140
Id. at § 203 .2( e)(iii)(A).
141
Id. at§ 203.2(e)(iii)(B).
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2.

Disclosure Requirements

HMDA requires covered lenders to disclose the total number
and dollar amount of their home purchase, 142 home refinance 143 and
144 1
.
145
• •
•
.
oan app 1·1cat1ons,
ongmat1ons
an d purh ome improvement
146
chases each year.
For each application or origination, the lender
must report several items of information, including the 1) type of
147
148
application or loan; 2) purpose of the application or loan; 3) type
149
150
of property; 4) owner-occupancy status of the property; 5) action
152
153
taken; 151 6) property location;
7) borrower income;
8) borrower
142

A home purchase loan is "a loan secured by and made for the purpose of
purchasing a dwelling." 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(h) (2008).
143
A home refinance loan is "a new obligation that satisfies and replaces an
existing obligation by the same borrower," in which "the existing obligation
is a home purchase loan" and both obligations "are secured by first liens on
dwellings." Id. at§ 203.2(k)(l).
144
A home improvement loan is "a loan secured by a lien on a dwelling" to
be used, at least in part, to repair, rehabilitate, remodel or improve a
dwelling or the real property on which it is located, or a loan not secured by
a dwelling that is for the same purpose and classified by the lender as a
home improvement loan. Id. at§ 203.2(g).
145
An application is "an oral or written request for" a home mortgage loan
"that is made in accordance with procedures used by a financial institution
for the type of credit requested." Id. at§ 203.2(b)(l).
146
12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(l) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) (2008).
147
12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(2) (2008). Loan or application types include: 1)
applications insured by the Federal Housing Administration; 2) applications
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration, Farm Services Agency or Rural
Housing Service; and 3) conventional applications. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(l)
(2006); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A, § I.A.3 (2008).
148
12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(3) (2008). Purposes include: 1) home purchase; 2)
home improvement; and 3) home refinance. Id. at pt. 203, app. A § I.A.5.
149
Id. at§ 203.4(a)(5); id. at pt. 203, app. A, § I.A.4. Property types include:
1) 1-4 family dwellings; 2) manufactured housing; and 3) multi-family
dwellings.
150
Id. at§ 203.4(a)(6).
151
Id. at §§ 203.4(a)(4), (8). Actions include: 1) loan originated, including
whether the loan began as a preapproval request; 2) application approved by
the bank but loan not accepted by the applicant; 3) application denied; 4)
preapproval request denied; 5) application withdrawn; and 6) application
file closed because incomplete. Id. at pt. 203, app. A,§ I..B.l. A request for
a preapproval must be reported if the financial institution analyzed the
creditworthiness of the applicant and issued a written commitment to the
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9) borrower ethnicity;
10) borrower gender;
11)
race;
difference between the loan's interest rate and the yield on Treasury
securities of comparable terms of maturity if the difference is three
points or more for loans secured by a first lien or five points or more

applicant valid for a specific period of time to extend a home purchase loan
up to a particular amount. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(2).
152
12 U.S.C. §§ 2803(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(9). A
lender must report property location by: 1) Metropolitan Statistical Area
("MSA") or Metropolitan Division ("MD"); 2) state; 3) county; and 4)
census tract if the loan is in a county with a population of 30,000 or more.
Id. at pt. 203, app. A, § I.C.1.-4. An MSA is a geographical area that has at
least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more people and includes any adjacent
area that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the
urbanized area as measured by commuting patterns. Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Glossary,

http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/glossary.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2009). An MSA with a population of 2.5 million or more may be
subdivided to form smaller groupings of counties called Metropolitan
Divisions. Id.
153
12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l0) (2008); 12
C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A, § I.D.6 (2006).
154
12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(10); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app.
A, § l.D.4. The racial categories are: I) "American Indian or Alaska
Native," meaning a "person having origins in any of the original peoples of
North or South America (including Central America) and who maintains
tribal affiliation or community attachment;" 2) "Asian," meaning a "person
having origins in any of the peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the
Indian subcontinent;" 3) "Black or African American," meaning a "person
having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa;" 4) "Native
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander," meaning a "person having origins in
any of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific
Islands;" and 5) "White," meaning "a person having origins in any of the
original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa." Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note I 16, at 6-7.
155
12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(10); id. at pt 203, app A, § I.D.3. Ethnic groups
include "Hispanic or Latino" and "not Hispanic or Latino." Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 116, at 7. Hispanic
or Latino includes a "person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or
Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race." Id.
156
12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l0); id. at pt. 203, app. A,§
I.D.5.
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12) whether the loan is
for loans secured by a subordinate lien;
subject to the HOEPA; 158 and 13) lien status of the loan.

D.

Subprime Lending Data and Its Impact

In late 2005, the Fed released a study based on data lenders
reported pursuant to the 2002 amendments. 159 The study showed that
in 2004, African-Americans, Latinos and residents of predominantly
minority neighborhoods were more likely than whites or residents of
predominantly white neighborhoods to receive "subprime" home
160
mortgage loans.
The report showed that the incidence of subprime
conventional first-lien home purchase loans was 32.4% for AfricanAmericans, 20.3% for Latinos and 8.7% for whites. 161 The Fed
concluded that some of the difference in the subprime lending rates
could be explained by differences in creditworthiness and other
factors, but even after taking these factors into account, there were
162
unexplained differences.
The Fed did not conclude that these
differences were based on race, but did not eliminate this possibility
either. 163 The Fed's report confirmed earlier studies, based on less
precise data, that showed that a higher percentage of the home
mortgage loans that African-Americans, Latinos and residents of
predominantly minority neighborhoods received were subprime as
164
compared with whites.
Additionally, several studies by researchers
and community groups and other advocates confirmed the Fed's
165
finding at the local level. For example, in 2005 in New York City,
157

12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(12).
12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(l3). A loan is covered by HOEPA if the interest
rate exceeds the yield on Treasury securities of comparable periods of
maturity by eight points for first liens and ten points for second liens or the
points and fees exceed greater of eight percent of the loan amount or an
annually adjusted dollar threshold. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, supra note 116, at 9.
159
Avery & Canner, supra note 105.
160
Id. at 379.
161 Id.
162
Id. After taking these factors into account, the incidence of subprime
loans decreased to 15.7% for African-Americans and 11.6% for whites.
163
Id. at 379-80.
164
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
165
WILLIAM C. APGAR, JR. & CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME LENDING AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL
SERVICE PROVIDERS: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS viii
158
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45.9% of all home mortgage loans to African-Americans were
subprime, and 39% of all home mortgage loans to Latinos were
subprime. 166 African-Americans were nearly three times more likely
than whites to receive a subprime loan; Latinos were more than twice
as likely. 167 Of all of the home loans in predominantly minority
neighborhoods, 42.1 % were subprime, nearly four times higher than
in predominantly white neighborhoods. 168
Nevertheless, in contrast to the firestorm that the disclosure
of HMDA data pursuant to the 1989 amendments caused, the
(2006); DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE
PRICE OF SUBPRTME MORTGAGES 3 (2006); CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT
COALITION, ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM: A MULTTST ATE ANALYSTS OF HIGHER COST HOME PURCHASE LENDING I (2007); JIM
CAMPEN, BORROWING TROUBLE VII: HIGHER-COST MORTGAGE LENDING
TN BOSTON, GREATER BOSTON AND MASSACHUSETTS, 2005 6 (2007); JIM
CAMPEN, BORROWING TROUBLE? VI: HIGHER-COST MORTGAGE LENDING
IN GREATER BOSTON, 2004 4 (2006); RICHARD MARSICO, THE ECON.
JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE JUSTICE ACTION CTR. N.Y. LAW SCH., THE
HIGHER COST OF BEING AFRICAN-AMERICAN OR LATINO: SUBPRIME HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING IN NEW YORK CITY, 2004-2005 3 (2007); NATIONAL
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES BY
RACE, INCOME, AND GENDER IN ALL METROPOLITAN AREAS IN AMERICA 3
(2005); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, THE CRA AND
FAIR LENDING PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TN THE CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA
4 (2006); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
COALITION, ET AL., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND WEAL TH BUILDING IMPEDED I
(2006); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, INCOME TS No
SHIELD AGAINST RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN LENDING: A COMPARISON OF
HIGH-COST LENDING IN AMERICA'S METROPOLITAN AREAS 5 (2007);
NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, PREAPPROVALS AND
PRICING DISPARITIES IN THE MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE: A NCRC
FOLLOW-UP REPORT FOR NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP MONTH 5 (2005);
NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, THE 2004 FAIR
LENDING DISPARITIES: STUBBORN AND PERSISTENT 5-6 (2005); NATIONAL
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, THE 2005 FAIR LENDING
DISPARITIES: STUBBORN AND PERSISTENT II 7 (2006); WOODSTOCK
INSTITUTE, NEW MORTGAGE PRICING DATA SHEDS LIGHT ON SUBPRTME
MARKET 2 (2005); NCRC Fair Lending Testing Reveals Discrimination by
Mortgage Brokers, NCRC REINVESTMENT WORKS I (National Community
Reinvestment Coalition), Summer, 2006, at 4.
166
See MARSICO, supra note 164, at 3-4.
167

Id.

168

Id. at 4.
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disclosure of the data under the 2002 amendments, while controversial, did not have the same impact. Although community advocates
published numerous studies showing these disparities, 169 headlines
across the nation did not materialize. Despite some noteworthy
exceptions, government investigation and enforcement efforts have
been sluggish. Highlights include former New York State Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer's investigation of subprime lending disparities
using 2004 HMDA data. He subsequently brought and settled a claim
against Countrywide in 2006. 170 Between January 1, 2004 and June
30, 2007, the four federal banking regulatory agencies referred 134
potential discrimination cases to the Department of Justice. 171
However, the Department has not filed any cases.
Private enforcement efforts were also slow to develop, but
recently the efforts have increased. For example, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition filed an administrative complaint
with HUD alleging that Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corporation
often steered minority "mystery shoppers" to subprime loans even
though they were qualified for prime loans, while Allied referred
white comparison "mystery shoppers" to prime loans. 172 In July
2007, the NAACP filed a class-action lawsuit against eleven
mortgage lenders, alleging that African-Americans received higher
percentages of subprime loans than whites. 173

Looking Ahead: The Role of HMDA in Detecting and
Deterring Risky, Unsafe, and Predatory Lending

V.

Although many factors contributed to the economic crisis of
2008, one common denominator is the high loan default rate on
risky, unsafe, and abusive loans. There were several efforts to
regulate such lending prior to the crisis, most notably through laws
requmng disclosure of loan terms. These efforts, however, were
generally not successful in either protecting the victims of such
169

See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
Berry, Countrywide Spitzer Deal A Disclosure Precedent?, 171

° Kate

17

AM. BANKER 1, 1 (Dec. 6, 2006).
171
Cheyenne Hopkins, HMDA Suits Backdrop.for Committee Hearings, 172
AM. BANKER I, 3 (July 25, 2007).
172
Complaint at 5, National Community Reinvestment Coalition v. Allied
Home Mortgage Capital Corporation, (U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urb. Dev.
filed June 14, 2006).
173
Hopkins, supra note 170, at 1.
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lending practices or preventing the economic collapse. The onset of
the economic crisis has given rise to proposals to reform regulation
of the financial services industry, including a proposal to amend
HMDA by expanding the disclosures it requires. This amendment
would require lenders to disclose a significant amount of information
about risky, unsafe, and abusive lending that harms borrowers and
contributed to the economic crisis. However, the proposed amendment does not quite require sufficient information to deter and detect
the full range of harmful and risky lending practices. In particular,
the amendment does not require lenders to disclose enough information about whether a loan is suitable for a borrower. Without
requiring sufficient disclosure, the proposed amendment runs the risk
of previous insufficient HMDA amendments-failing to persuade
government decision makers that the underlying problem exists.

A.

The Role of Risky, Unsafe and Abusive Lending
in the Current Economic Crisis

The causes of the economic collapse of 2008 are complex
and will likely not be fully understood for years. Yet by now, the
story of the collapse has been told numerous times and it has become
sadly familiar: the sharp fall in housing prices in 2006 was followed
by the "subprime meltdown" in 2007, characterized by high rates of
defaults and foreclosure on homes secured by subprime loans. 174 This
meltdown resulted in the collapse of several financial institutions in
2008 and the bare survival of others, followed by the freezing of the
credit markets, widespread layoffs, and displacement in all areas of
the American economy .175 Also well-documented are the wrenching
human consequences of millions as people have lost their homes and
jobs, and nearly all have lost their sense of well-being and security.

174

Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis
and the Social Capital Response, 60 S.C. L. REV. 271, 295 (2009).
175
See, e.g., Id. at 295-96; Gerald Komgold, Legal and Policy Choices in
the Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L.
REV. 549, 728-33 (2009); Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown: How Did it Happen and How Will it End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED
FIN. 13, 14-16 (2007); Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime
Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 549-53 (2009). For a general overview of the securitization process, see Amy L. Festante, Securitization 's
Role in the Collapse of the Subprime Mortgage Market (Justice Action
Center Student Capstone Journal, Project No. 07/08-028, 2008).
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Many are implicated in the collapse, from borrowers who
could not afford to repay their loans, to mortgage brokers who made
loans they knew were unaffordable, to lenders who provided the
funds for the loans they knew were unsafe, to investment bankers
who pressured lenders to reduce credit standards and purchased and
packaged the loans for sale as securities to the secondary market
without proper scrutiny, to rating agencies that overrated the
securities, and to investors who were hungry for high returns. In the
aftermath of the collapse, there has been much finger pointing among
and at them. 176
Regardless of the ultimate causes and who the responsible
parties are, the use of risky, unsafe, and abusive loans 177 are part of
the picture, if not the ultimate cause, of the collapse. These loans
were too risky to withstand economic displacement and once the
displacement occurred, defaults on these loans certainly helped spark
the causal chain that led to the current crisis. 178 These risky, unsafe,
176

See Brescia, supra note 174, at 291-300; Korngold, supra note 174, at
728-33; Ruth S. Uselton, Exotic Loan Products & the Collapse of the
Subprime Mortgage Market 12-13 (Justice Action Center Student Capstone
Journal, Project No. 07/08-02A, 2008).
177
These three terms for characterizing loans that are not part of the prime
market, although often interchangeable when applied to a particular loan,
are meant to capture three different ways of looking at non-prime loans.
"Risky" loans include loans that carry more than the normal amount of risk,
such as a loan that does not document the borrower's income or assets.
"Unsafe" loans include loans that the borrower does not have a realistic
chance of repaying, including a loan whose monthly interest payments are
too high a percentage of the borrower's monthly income. See Baher Azmy,
Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories
of Experimentation, 57 U. FLA. L. REV. 295, 355 (2005) (stating that
"certain practices are inherently dangerous when connected with very highcost loans .... ")."Abusive" loans are based on misrepresentation, fraud, or
exploitation. For examples of abusive lending practices, see id. at 333;
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1267-68
(2002); Celeste M. Hammond, Predatory Lending-A Legal Definition and
Update, 34 REAL EST. L. J. 176, 180 (2005). A non-prime loan may contain
a combination of aspects of all three of these characteristics or just one. An
effective HMDA disclosure regime would capture as many of the
characteristics of risky, unsafe, and abusive loans as possible.
178
See Krinsman, supra note 175, at 14 ("Once the housing market slowed,
the credit risk of the subprime mortgage market could no longer be masked
by surging home prices.").
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and abusive loans are often characterized by the terms "subprime" or
"predatory" loans. Subprime loans, as described earlier, are loans that
charge higher interest rates and fees to reflect higher borrower risk
factors. 179 While there is no standard definition of predatory
lending, 180 loans with certain characteristics are generally deemed
predatory. Predatory loans occur when the terms provide no benefit
to the borrower and are simply an excuse for extracting profit, the
borrower has no real chance of repaying the loan, the terms are
confusing or misleading, the terms are not related to the borrower's
level of risk, the borrower's risk is not properly assessed, or the loan
was made based on fraud or misrepresentation of the terms. 181 A nonexhaustive list of these predatory loan characteristics includes
. I 82 ba 11 oon payments, 183 negative
•
•
prepayment pena Ities,
amortiza185
tion, 184 asset-based loans,
high housing debt/income and overall

179

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See Hammond, supra note 177, at 178.
181
Cf Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1260, stating that predatory
lending is:
[A] syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that
involve one or more of the following five problems:
1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate
net harm to borrowers; 2) harmful rent seeking; 3) loans
involving fraud or deceptive practices; 4) other forms of
lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as
fraud; and 5) loans that require borrowers to waive
meaningful legal redress.
182
A prepayment penalty is a penalty for repaying a loan before it is due.
See Azmy, supra note 177, at 338; Uselton, supra note 176, at 9.
183
A balloon payment is a payment due at a certain point in the life of the
loan that could represent the outstanding balance of the loan or another
amount that is much higher than the minimum monthly payment. See Azmy,
supra note 177, at 340; Uselton, supra note 176, at 9-10.
184
A negatively amortizing loan is a loan whose monthly interest payments
are not high enough to pay the monthly balance due, resulting in an
increased loan balance (negatively amortizing) rather than a decreased loan
balance. See Azmy, supra note 177, at 340-41; Engel & McCoy, supra note
177, at 1263-64.
185
An asset-based loan is a loan that is based on the value of the collateral
for the loan rather than the borrower's ability to repay the loan. See Azmy,
supra note 177, at 337; Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1262.
180
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debt/income ratios, 186 excessively high fees, interest rates, and
points, 187 high loan-to-value ratios, 188 confusing adjustable rate
periods, 189 and little or no documentation of the borrower's income,
employment, source of funds, or assets. 190
B.

Past Efforts to Regulate Risky, Unsafe and
Abusive Lending

Since the onset of the economic collapse, there have been
many proposals to deal with this crisis and prevent another one. 191
Enhanced regulation of the financial services industry is one idea,
and the Obama administration has introduced legislation that would
overhaul the regulation of the industry. 192 Even prior to the economic
collapse, however, risky, unsafe, and abusive lending was the subject
186

These ratios, which measure the borrower's monthly housing debt and
overall debt payments against the borrower's monthly income, are often
used as measures of the borrower's ability to repay a loan.
187
Lenders charge fees for things like their attorneys, the property appraisal
and a credit check. Points are fees charged as percentage "points" of the
overall loan, often shared by a mortgage broker if one is involved in the
loan.
188
The loan-to-value ratio compares the amount of the loan to the value of
the property that is the collateral for the loan. Generally, the higher the ratio,
the riskier the loan.
189
Adjustable rate mortgages establish an initial interest rate that adjusts to
a different level, often based on an index, after a certain time period. See
Krinsman, supra note 175, at 15; Uselton, supra note 176, at 3-4.
19
Compare this list of characteristics with Hammond, supra note 177, at
180, listing prepayment penalties, balloon payments, high interest rates,
negative amortization, high appraisal costs, up front credit insurance,
mandatory pre-dispute resolution clauses and prohibited "kickbacks" to
brokers in the guise of yield spread premiums as characteristic terms of
predatory loans. See also CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT COALITION, ET AL.,
PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM Ill: PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE
LENDING TO LOWER-INCOME COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR ii
(2009) (listing adjustable rates, negative amortization, interest-only loan
payments, prepayment penalties, yield spread premiums and no-income
documentation as loan terms associated with risky loans).
191
See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 174, at 304-11 (suggesting mortgage broker
accountability, community-based pre-loan counseling, and specialized
foreclosure courts).
192
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 11 lth
Cong. (2009).
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oflegislation and many other reform proposals because of the harm it
caused to borrowers. 193 Congress passed or amended legislation such
as the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") 194 and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESP A"), 195 with the intention of
curbing predatory lending by requiring lenders to disclose the costs
and terms of loans to borrowers. Congress also passed HOEPA, 196
which banned certain terms on specific types of home mortgage
loans whose interest rates passed a certain threshold or whose points
and fees were higher than a fixed percentage of the loan amount or a
specific dollar amount. 197 Several states attempted to regulate
predatory lending as well, although federal legislation preempted
many of their efforts. 198
Among the previously passed legislation, TILA and RESP A
have frequently been considered unsuccessful 199 or even harmfuI. 200
HOEP A's attempt to curb abusive lending practices directly has
received similar criticism. 201 Comprehensive laws regulating
193

See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 177, at 84; Engel & McCoy, supra note 177,
at 1305.
194
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2006).
195
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U .S.C. §§ 1831 b,
2601-17 (2006).
196
Homeownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 U .S.C. §§ 1639,
1648 (2006).
197
See Azmy, supra note 177, at 352-55. Prohibited terms and practices
include negative amortization and in certain instances balloon payments,
prepayment penalties and asset-based lending.
198
See id. at 361-90; Hammond, supra note 177, at 189-203.
199
See Azmy, supra note 177, at 351-52 (arguing that disclosure of loan
terms has not worked because there is little price competition in the
predatory lending market, predatory loans are usually so complex that
comparing loan products is virtually impossible and disclosures come too
late in the process to make a difference); Engel & McCoy, supra note 177,
at 1306-09 (arguing that TILA has not worked because it exempts too many
fees from disclosure and RESPA has not worked because it has resulted in
lengthy and confusing disclosure statements).
200
See Azmy, supra note 177, at 352 (arguing that the lending industry
recognizes the legal and political advantages of complying with disclosure
rules, including allowing them to mask the complexity of the underlying
loans, defending against allegations of oral misrepresentations, and
providing political cover against charges that their loans are too expensive
or abusive and are a shield against calls for more regulation of loan terms).
201
See id. at 355-57 (arguing that HOEPA's points and fees triggers are too
high causing very few loans fall under its coverage, that the triggers are high
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predatory lending have not been passed, perhaps because they tend to
contradict market-based solutions to risky, unsafe and abusive
lending. 202 Efforts to impose direct curbs on abusive lending
practices are opposed by arguments that the government should not
interfere with individual credit transactions, that regulation would
limit the amount of available credit, that people should take
individual responsibility for their financial decisions and that the
market will self-correct. 203
One proposal to regulate the terms of predatory lending that
merit continuing attention-and that differs from the TILA's and the
RESPA's disclosure rules and the HOEPA's limited efforts to
regulate loan terms-is imposing a "suitability" requirement on
home mortgage loans. 204 Based on similar requirements for investors
in the securities industry, a suitability requirement for home
mortgage loans would establish criteria for determining whether a
loan is suitable for the borrower. One suitability proposal would
prohibit lenders from making a loan that was not consistent with the
borrower's financial circumstances, needs and objectives. 205 Another
enough to allow room for abuse and exploitation in loans that do not trigger
HOEPA coverage and that lenders have discovered loopholes to avoid
falling within HOEPA's coverage); Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at
1307-08, 1349 (arguing that HOEPA is easy to evade because of its narrow
coverage and high interest and fee triggers and that to avoid these triggers,
lenders create complex pricing mechanisms that make non-prime loans
more complex than they otherwise might have been).
202
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1299 ("From the standpoint of
neoclassical economics, market solutions are the preferred answer to
predatory lending.").
203
Id. at 1334, 1358-60. For a discussion of the difficulties of balancing
regulation with individual freedom and the risks of mistakes see Komgold,
supra note 174, at 733 (noting the difficulty in striking the proper balance
between "personal responsibility and paternalism in ... setting the ground
rules for the overall system").
204
See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It:
Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate
Predatory Lending, 10 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. 117, 125-27
(2001); Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1317-66.
205
Ehrenberg, supra note 204, at 125. To make this determination, lenders
would be expected to inquire into several factors, including the borrower's
age, occupation, estimated income, employment status, assets and net worth,
marital status, number of dependents, credit references and history, ability
to repay the loan, other debts, and the condition and appraised value of the
collateral and the amount of the owner's equity in the collateral. Id. at 126.
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proposal suggests several standards for suitability, including
prohibiting lenders from making loans that borrowers cannot reasonably be expected to repay and basing loan fees, charges and points on
legitimate pricing functions. 206 Suitability would thus go beyond
disclosure of loan terms to ensure that loans are not overly risky,
unsafe or abusive. A suitability requirement could both protect the
borrower from the consequences of taking such a loan and protect the
economy as a whole from collapse if overall economic conditions
result in dangerously high levels of default on risky and unsafe
loans. 207 Despite the merits of the suitability proposal, Congress has
not passed legislation imposing it, perhaps because of the power of
the market-based arguments that underlie the current disclosure
.
208
regime.
C.

The Role of HMDA in Regulating Risky, Unsafe
and Abusive Lending

In the context of the current economic crisis, efforts to avert
the next one and previous efforts and proposals to regulate risky,
unsafe and abusive lending, the question is whether the sort of public
disclosure of lending reflected in HMDA can play a meaningful role.
HMDA's history has shown that when compelling data about lending
practices are disclosed to the public, real change can occur. The
converse is also true. Insufficient data has resulted in limited change.
So the question for any proposals to amend HMDA is whether the
proposal incorporates this lesson from HMDA's history and contains
sufficient information to detect and deter risky, unsafe and abusive
lending and the lenders that engage in it.
The proposed CFP AA, 209 among several provisions that
would overhaul the regulation of the financial services industry,
proposes several changes to HMDA that would help it detect risky,
unsafe and abusive lending by requiring several additional

206

Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1343.
But see Schwarcz, supra note 175, at 566 (suggesting that inlposing
suitability requirements on mortgage loans and otherwise restricting
predatory lending may have restricted externalities but would "almost
certainly not address the next crisis").
208
SeeEngel&McCoy,supranote 177,at 1334, 1358, 1360.
209
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, I I Ith
Cong. (2009).
207
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disclosures. 210 The first group of proposed disclosures would require
a lender to disclose the total number and dollar value of home
mortgage loans grouped according to: 1) the total points and fees
payable at origination; 2) the difference between the APR associated
with the loan and a benchmark APR for all loans; and 3) the term in
months of any prepayment penalty. The second group of disclosures
requires the lender to disclose the total number and dollar volume of
home mortgage loans and the total number of completed applications
for loans grouped according to the following characteristics: 1) the
age of the applicant or borrower; 2) the value of the collateral; 3) the
term in months of any introductory period after which the rate of
interest may change; 4) the presence of mortgage terms that would
allow the borrower or applicant to make payments other than fullyamortizing payments during any portion of the loan term; 5) the term
in months of the mortgage loan; 6) the channel through which the
application was made, including retail and broker; and 7) the credit
score of mortgage applicant or borrower.
These proposed amendments would improve HMDA's
ability to accomplish its current tripartite mission of detecting and
counteracting redlining, lending discrimination and reverse redlining.
In particular, requiring disclosure of a loan's total points and fees and
the difference between the loan's APR and a benchmark APR would
help detect and deter lending discrimination. Likewise, the disclosure
of the applicant's and borrower's credit score would help to identify
discrimination and reverse redlining. 211 The amendments, if passed,
would also mark the beginning of another significant era in HMDA's
history by adding another task to its mission: detecting and deterring
risky, unsafe and abusive lending. The goal would be to help prevent
another economic collapse fueled by risky and unsafe lending and
also to help prevent several of the predatory lending practices that
harm individual borrowers. 212
In combination with the information HMDA currently
requires lenders to disclose, the proposed HMDA amendments would
identify many of the risky, unsafe and abusive lending practices that
were at the heart of the economic crisis. The disclosures were
210

H.R. 3126 §§ 1086(g)(I), (4).
See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
212
See CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT COALITION, ET AL., supra note 190, at ii
("Improving HMDA data disclosure to include risky loan features ... will
improve the quality of lending in low- and moderate-income communities
and communities of color.").
211
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proposed as intentionally broad in an attempt to identify past and
existing undesirable practices and new and unanticipated practices as
well.213
There are several examples of the impact these disclosures
would have. First, adjustable rate loans with prepayment penalties
have been identified as having contributed to the economic crisis. 214
Borrowers who took a loan at an affordable rate that would become
unaffordable once the rate adjusted with the promise that they could
refinance were unable to do so when the rate adjusted once housing
prices dropped and the value of their collateral decreased. 215 The
proposed HMDA amendments would likely capture many of these
loans by requiring disclosure of the APR, prepayment penalty terms
and interest rate adjustment periods. Second, by requiring disclosure
of points, fees, APR and the borrower's credit score, the amendments
would help evaluate whether the interest rate is tied to the borrower's
risk level, and thus possibly excessive. Excessive fees and rates are
not only arguably harmful to the borrower, but in times of crisis
make it more difficult to repay. And if, as demonstrated by the
requirement that the lender's APR be compared with a benchmark,
the lender's APR is higher than the aggregate, this can be an
indication that the lender is engaged in predatory or discriminatory
practices not justified by overall market conditions. Third, another
proposed amendment would help detect negatively amortizing loans,
which by increasing the loan amount relative to the collateral become
especially risky when housing prices drop. Finally, requiring
disclosure of the age of the borrower and the channel through which
the loan was made, combined with the other proposed disclosures,
would help detect and deter abusive practices aimed at elderly home

213

See Schwarcz, supra note 175, at 560 ("It is impossible to know how
future financial crises will arise. Ultimately, the key to protecting against
future crises is to remain open, flexible, and aware of changing
circumstances. To this end, the government should take a broad and flexible
approach.").
214
See Uselton, supra note 176, at 4-6.
215 See Brescia, supra note 174, at 296; Schwarcz, supra note 175, at 55051.
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mortgage loan applicants and borrowers216 and identify lending
channels that are more likely to lead to predatory loans. 217
Despite the breadth of these proposals to amend HMDA, the
added disclosures do not cover many of the other practices identified
as having contributed to the economic crisis. In addition, they do not
require sufficient information to determine whether a loan is suitable
for the borrower. For example, two types of loans-stated income
loans, in which the borrower's income is not verified, and "low-doc"
and "no-doc" loans, which require little or no documentation of other
information relevant to the lending decision-have been associated
with predatory and risky lending and implicated in the economic
crisis, 218 but the proposed amendments do not require lenders to
disclose the total number of such loans.
Another phenomenon associated with unsafe and abusive
lending is "loan flipping," in which the lender makes several loans in
a short period of time to the same borrower-each with increasingly
higher balances and each with higher fees and each less affordable to
the borrower-resulting in high rates of foreclosure. 219 One piece of
information that would be helpful in detecting loan flipping would be
the period in months between the borrower's last loan and the current
one. The proposed amendments also do not require disclosure of
loans with balloon payments, which could have the same effect as
adjustable interest rates and prepayment penalties by forcing a
borrower to refinance at a time of personal or overall economic
difficulty and increasing the probability of default or foreclosure. 220
Most notably, the proposed HMDA amendments do not
contain enough information to determine whether a loan is suitable
for the borrower. In the context of expanding HMDA data to detect
and deter unsafe and abusive lending that is harmful to borrowers
and could lead to another economic crisis, "suitability" should be
defined at the very least to include loans that the borrower has a
reasonable likelihood of repaying. Many of the proposed disclosures
216

See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 177, at 334 (identifying the elderly as
frequent victims of predatory lending).
217
See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 174, at 295 (citing a study showing that in
2004, nearly half of all subprime loans went through a broker compared
with 28% of all prime loans).
218
See id. at 296; Krinsman, supra note 175, at 15.
219
See Azmy, supra note 177204, at 335-36; Ehrenberg, supra note 204, at
181; Engel & McCoy, supra note 177, at 1263.
220
See Uselton, supra note 176, at 9-10.
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will help determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a
loan can be repaid, including the loan's points and fees, APR,
interest rate adjustment period, prepayment penalty and the value of
the collateral. However, several other disclosures are necessary,
including disclosure of low- and no-doc loans and information
relating to loan flipping. Most importantly, the borrower's housing
debt/income and overall debt/income ratios should be disclosed, as
they are crucial in determining whether the borrower can repay a
loan and whether the loan is suitable.
The main potential arguments against these proposals to
expand HMDA's disclosures are that they would cost too much and
undermine market operations. In addressing the cost of these
disclosures, several factors should be taken into account. As the
history of HMDA shows, if the information that HMDA disclosures
elicit is insufficient to describe or demonstrate the harm the
disclosures are intended to address, the impact of the disclosure will
be limited, wasting at least some of the cost of such disclosures. The
marginal cost of the added disclosures increases the value of the
entire investment in information disclosure. The cost of the added
disclosures should also be measured against the potential cost of
failing to disclose the information. If the marginal cost of the
additional information can help prevent the risky, unsafe, and
abusive lending that helped spark the economic crisis-and there is a
good argument based on HMDA's history that comprehensive
disclosure does have an impact on lending behavior-then the
marginal cost of the disclosures could potentially save trillions of
dollars of evaporated wealth and government spending that have
accompanied the current crisis.
Regarding the market-based arguments, reference to the
legislative history accompanying HMDA's passage is relevant. As
Senator Proxmire pointed out, HMDA's required disclosures are a
"gentle remedy" that do not prohibit or penalize anything. 221
Disclosure of complete information about risky, unsafe and abusive
loan practices does not prohibit any lending, does not impose lending
terms and does not penalize predatory lending. Instead, as made clear
in HMDA's original legislative history, disclosure simply provides
consumers and government officials with facts about lending, facts
that promote rather than inhibit the market. These facts can, in turn,
assist community groups in identifying lenders that may be engaging
in abusive tactics so they can work with them to change their
221

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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practices, 222 alert consumers about lenders to avoid 223 and assist
government officials in making decisions about how to enforce the
law and whether the level of risk in the home mortgage lending
market is too high.

VL

Conclusion

As HMDA enters its thirty-fifth year, looking back at its
history can help chart its course ahead. HMDA uses the power of
public disclosure of information about lending to accomplish its
various goals, including detecting and deterring redlining, lending
discrimination and reverse redlining. HMDA's overall success is in
direct proportion to the amount and sufficiency of the information it
requires lenders to disclose in connection with the practices to be
eliminated. With the economic crisis of 2008 have come numerous
proposals to reform regulation of the financial services industry,
including a proposal to amend HMDA to detect and deter many of
the risky, unsafe and abusive lending practices that have harmed
borrowers and helped fuel the crisis. The proposals are helpful but do
not go quite far enough in requiring sufficient data disclosure. Based
on HMDA's prior history, Congress would be wise to make HMDA
as effective a tool as possible in regulating home mortgage lending to
the benefit of affected borrowers and the economy.

222

See CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT COALITION, ET AL., supra note 190, at ii
("Additionally, expanding data collection would give communities the tools
to better understand the lending occurring in their neighborhoods."). This
use ofHMDA is also a part of its original justification. See supra notes 3435 and accompanying text.
223
This theme is also familiar in HMDA's legislative history, which
suggested that HMDA data would enable communities to detect and deter
redlining. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.

